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HOW SCIENCE CAN IMPROVE REGULATION: NOISE 
CONTROL IN URBAN AREAS 
Luis Inaraja Vera* 
The issue of noise is becoming increasingly problematic in urban areas. Research 
has revealed that it not only contributes to hearing loss, but also to cardiovascular disease, 
psychiatric disorders, and even slower language development and learning in children. 
Preventing these effects would require a significant decrease in noise levels. However, 
experts report that community noise levels are actually increasing. Moreover, zoning in 
many cities and towns is shifting to a model in which different types of land uses tend to 
be closer to one another, which increases the potential for conflict over noise. 
This Article draws on the scientific literature on noise to argue that cities can alle-
viate this problem by improving noise ordinances and proposes a non-exhaustive list of 
measures aimed at reaching this goal. First, adjusting noise standards to reflect citizens’ 
varying tolerance for noise at different times of the day would make noise ordinances more 
efficient. Second, measuring noise levels where the harm is caused, rather than where the 
noise is produced, would add flexibility to noise control frameworks. Third, by accounting 
for noise characteristics—frequency and impulsiveness—that play an important role in 
determining how unpleasant a particular type of noise is, municipalities would be able to 
more adequately evaluate the harm that noise can cause.  
While this list focuses on what municipalities can do to improve their noise ordi-
nances, these recommendations can be applied to regulation by other levels of govern-
ment. This Article is mainly concerned with noise in mixed-use districts, and therefore 
focuses on improving regulatory frameworks in the municipal context. However, because 
this Article’s suggestions are aimed at making noise control frameworks more effective 
and efficient, states and the federal government can also incorporate them into their noise-
control statutes and regulations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Noise, which has been defined as a “disagreeable or undesired” sound,1 is a very 
serious problem in urban areas.2 Its potential health effects are diverse and some of them 
                                                          
 1. Colin H. Hansen, Fundamentals of Acoustics, in OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE TO NOISE: EVALUATION, 
PREVENTION AND CONTROL 23 (Berenice Goelzer et al. eds., 2001). 
 2. In 2002, for example, New York City’s former Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg adopted the so-called “Op-
eration Silent Night” to reduce excessive noise. Jennifer Steinhauer, It Never Sleeps, But City Does Demand 
Quiet, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/25/nyregion/it-never-sleeps-but-city-
does-demand-quiet.html. 
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are unknown to many. While the most common consequences of noise are sleep disturb-
ance, hearing loss, and reduction in performance, experts have also identified other more 
serious effects, such as cardiovascular disease, abnormal endocrine responses, and psychi-
atric disorders.3 Researchers have even shown that noise causes children to have slower 
language development and learning.4 These problems affect a not insignificant portion of 
the American population. Hearing loss, for example, affects fifteen percent of Americans.5 
Preventing some of these effects would require a decrease in noise levels of ten dec-
ibels.6 This is a very significant reduction: given the nature of this unit of measurement, a 
ten decibel decrease results in a sound that is only half as loud.7 Meanwhile, despite the 
technological advances in the field of noise control, noise levels keep rising. Community 
noise levels experienced an eleven percent increase in the United States between 1987 and 
1997.8 One author explains that noise levels in cities may be increasing at a rate of 0.5 
decibels per year.9 
This is particularly troubling for many urban areas in the United States, given the 
growing interest in mixed-use districts, that is, areas where different types of land uses 
(e.g., residential, commercial, and industrial) coexist.10 Under a more traditional zoning 
approach, which tended to segregate uses to avoid conflict, the issue of noise was often 
minimized by merely separating noise-producing activities from areas with high sensitiv-
ity to noise.11 As the United States Supreme Court framed it in a landmark zoning decision, 
“[a] nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong place.”12 In mixed-use districts, 
however, where the separation of potentially conflicting uses is not desired, local govern-
ments must find other types of solutions. 
The existing legal literature on noise control has mostly focused on regulation at the 
federal level,13 new formulas under tort law,14 new regulatory frameworks to tackle the 
                                                          
 3. Stephen A. Stansfeld & Mark P. Matheson, Noise Pollution: Non-Auditory Effects on Health, 68 BRIT. 
MED. BULL. 243, 244–49 (2003).  
 4. Charlotte Clark & Stephen A. Stansfeld, The Effect of Aircraft and Road Traffic Noise on Children’s 
Reading, LITERACY TODAY, September 2005, at 24, 25. 
 5. Hendi Crosby Kowal, Millions of Americans Need Hearing Aids. Why Don’t They Have Them?, 
ALTARUM INST. (Jan. 14, 2016), http://altarum.org/health-policy-blog/millions-of-americans-need-hearing-aids-
why-don%E2%80%99t-they-have-them. 
 6. Jonathon Keats, 20 Things You Didn’t Know About. . . Noise, DISCOVER (May 23, 2014), http://discover-
magazine.com/2014/june/24-20-things-you-didnt-know-about-noise. 
 7. DB ENGINEERING, Four Ways to Quiet a Noisy Machine, http://800nonoise.com/tutorials/four-ways-to-
quiet-a-noisy-machine (last visited July 24, 2017). 
 8. Susan L. Staples, Public Policy and Environmental Noise: Modeling Exposure or Understanding Effects, 
87 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2063, 2063 (1997). 
 9. WORLD SOUNDSCAPE PROJECT ET AL., HANDBOOK FOR ACOUSTIC ECOLOGY: NOISE POLLUTION (Barry 
Truax ed., SIMON FRASER UNIV. 1999),  http://www.sfu.ca/sonic-studio/handbook/Noise_Pollution.html (last 
visited July 24, 2017). 
 10. See sources cited infra note 24. 
 11. Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David Schleicher, The Steep Costs of Using Noncumulative Zoning to Preserve 
Land for Urban Manufacturing, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 249, 255, 272 (2010) (explaining that one of the justifications 
for separating residences from industry under the noncumulative zoning approach was to deal with nuisance 
problems). 
 12. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926). 
 13. Sidney A. Shapiro, Lessons from a Public Policy Failure: EPA and Noise Abatement, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
1, 20 (1992). 
 14. Jason A. Lief, Insuring Domestic Tranquility Through Quieter Products: A Proposed Product-Nuisance 
Tort, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 595, 628 (1994). 
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noise caused by mobile sources,15 and the nuisance/regulation dichotomy.16 This Article 
claims that noise problems in urban environments, and in mixed-use districts in particular, 
can be alleviated by improving noise ordinances to better accommodate the different in-
terests at stake—i.e., citizens’ need for low noise levels and society’s need for commercial 
and industrial activities. Although municipal regulation has improved greatly since the 
first known ordinance enacted in Greece in the sixth century B.C.—which required roost-
ers and tinsmiths to be outside the city limits17—many good practices in the area of noise 
control are not applied uniformly, even in major cities.18 
This Article draws on empirical scientific literature and the experience that munici-
palities have acquired during the past decades to suggest a set of improvements to noise 
ordinances. First, adjusting noise standards to reflect citizens’ varying tolerance for noise 
at different times of the day would make noise ordinances more efficient. Second, meas-
uring noise levels where the harm is caused, rather than where the noise is produced, would 
add flexibility to noise control frameworks. Third, by accounting for noise characteristics, 
such as frequency and impulsiveness, both of which play an important role in determining 
how unpleasant noise is, municipalities would be able to more adequately evaluate the 
harm that different types of noise can cause. 
While this list focuses on what municipalities can do to improve their noise ordi-
nances, these recommendations can be applied to regulation by other levels of government. 
This Article is mainly concerned with noise in mixed-use districts, and therefore focuses 
on improving regulatory frameworks in the municipal context. However, because the sug-
gestions this Article makes are aimed at making noise control frameworks more effective 
and efficient, states and the federal government can also incorporate them into their noise-
control statutes and regulations. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I explains why mixed-use districts are becom-
ing increasingly popular, as well as why this increases the need for improved noise control 
frameworks. Part II provides an overview of noise regulation. Noise can be tackled at the 
federal, state, and local level. In turn, states can rely on the doctrine of nuisance or create 
their own regulatory framework to supplement it. Municipalities generally have authority 
to enact noise ordinances, which can adopt a variety of forms and have different degrees 
of sophistication. 
Part III lays out a series of features that noise ordinances should include to control 
noise effectively and efficiently. This includes incorporating the teachings of psychoa-
coustics to ensure that ordinances are correctly accounting for the harm that different types 
of sounds cause.19 Moreover, ordinances can be more efficient when they have multiple 
                                                          
 15. See, e.g., Steven N. Brautigam, Rethinking the Regulation of Car Horn and Car Alarm Noise: An Incen-
tive-Based Proposal to Help Restore Civility to Cities, 19 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 391, 419 (1994); David B. Torrey 
& Jeffrey R. McCulley, Limiting Motorcycle Exhaust Noise Through Amendment of the Motor Vehicle Code and 
Its Regulations, 25 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 49, 51 (2006). 
 16. Aaron C. Dunlap, Come on Feel the Noise: The Problem with Municipal Noise Regulation, 15 U. MIAMI 
BUS. L. REV. 47, 49 (2006) (“The Article will concentrate on the dichotomy between a zoning approach of re-
strictive noise ordinances and common law regulation through nuisance actions.”). 
 17. Keats, supra note 6. 
 18. See infra Part II.C.3; supra notes 144, 185, and accompanying text.  
 19. Psychoacoustics is the study of how certain features of sound—e.g., temporal structure or timbre—affect 
the annoyance it can cause on people. See YOSHIHARU SOETA & YOICHI ANDO, NEURALLY BASED 
MEASUREMENT AND EVALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL NOISE 167 (2015). 
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noise standards to reflect people’s varying tolerance to noise at different times of the day. 
Local regulators can also control noise more efficiently by measuring noise at the location 
of those who are affected by it, instead of measuring the noise at the source’s location. Part 
IV examines the issue of whether existing activities should be exempt from amendments 
to ordinances that incorporate these types of measures, as well as the potential takings 
implications of changing noise control frameworks. 
I. BACKGROUND: MIXED-USE DISTRICTS AND THE PROBLEM OF NOISE 
Planning theory has long supported the idea that different land uses should be cate-
gorized (e.g., residential, commercial, agricultural, and industrial) and kept apart from 
each other.20 Originally, the main reason justifying this separation of uses in large urban 
areas, such as New York City, was the need to address safety issues—mostly fire and 
health concerns.21 
More recently, however, land-use segregation has been subject to many criticisms, 
and, as a result, there has been a “gradual but dramatic shift in planning thinking” towards 
mixing land uses.22 This is an ongoing process, and today we still see debates over what 
the right mix of uses (e.g., light industrial or commercial with residential) is optimal for a 
particular area.23 What seems clear at this point is that the interest in mixed-use districts is 
growing and that these configurations are becoming increasingly popular in many cities.24 
As the discussion below shows, the notions of cumulative zoning and performance zoning 
provide a good framework to further explore the recent support for mixed-use districts. 
A. The Cumulative Zoning/Noncumulative Zoning Distinction 
The evolution of the debate about whether cumulative zoning is more appropriate 
than its noncumulative counterpart, or vice-versa, is helpful to understand why mixed dis-
tricts are becoming more and more popular. The distinction between these two types of 
zoning is premised on the theory that there is a hierarchy of uses, in which residential is 
generally the highest use, followed by commercial, and industrial.25 The first zoning ordi-
nances adopted a cumulative approach, i.e., they allowed, in areas dedicated to lower uses 
(less restrictive zones), these lower uses plus any other use that was higher, but the reverse 
                                                          
 20. Sonia Hirt, The Mixed-Use Trend: Planning Attitudes and Practices in Northeast Ohio, 24 J. 
ARCHITECTURAL & PLANNING RES. 224, 225 (2007).  
 21. Chad Lamer, Why Government Policies Encourage Urban Sprawl and the Alternatives Offered by New 
Urbanism, 13 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 391, 393 (2004). 
 22. Hirt, supra note 20, at 225. 
 23. Chelsea Davis, DeSmet School Seeks to Address Lack of Housing, Mixed-Use Zoning in District, 
MISSOULIAN (Jan. 10, 2017), http://missoulian.com/news/local/desmet-school-seeks-to-address-lack-of-hous-
ing-mixed-use/article_5215055e-00a1-5c87-868e-6661831a585d.html.  
 24. See JANNA BLASINGAME CUSTER, NEW URBANISM AND EUCLIDIAN ZONING: CAN THEY CO-EXIST? 5 
(2007) (explaining how “[i]n metro Atlanta . . . counties and cities have been revising their ordinances in recent 
years to encourage mixed-use developments” and that “Georgia city manager Kathy Brannon noted, ‘The change 
[in her city’s ordinances to allow for mixed-use communities was] market driven.’”); Hirt, supra note 20, at 225 
(stating that “[t]he mixed-use principle has become a key tenet of the most influential current planning para-
digms”); Lamer, supra note 21, at 391 (advocating for the amendment of zoning ordinances to allow mixed-use 
neighborhoods). 
 25. Lamer, supra note 21, at 395. 
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did not hold true.26 In other words, while residences—the highest use—were allowed in 
industrial or commercial districts—i.e., lower uses—, this form of zoning excluded indus-
trial or commercial uses from residential areas.27 
Later, after World War II, noncumulative zones started becoming more wide-
spread.28 Noncumulative zoning, in addition to excluding lower uses from higher-use ar-
eas, as cumulative zoning did, also excluded higher uses from lower use zones.29 Thus, 
under a noncumulative approach, industries cannot be located in residential areas but, un-
like with cumulative zoning, residences are not allowed in industrial zones. As some au-
thors have noted, one of the main reasons that justified that shift was that “lower uses . . . 
also required protection from higher uses . . . if zoning legislation was to be effective.”30 
This idea, coupled with the willingness to retain industry after the shipping revolution had 
made cities less attractive to industry, led New York City and other major cities to adopt 
some form of noncumulative zoning to prevent other uses from pricing out factories.31 
More recently, scholars have questioned the validity of these two arguments in sup-
port of noncumulative zoning.32 The first argument in favor of noncumulative zoning has 
been that residences in manufacturing areas are a threat to industries because they may 
subject the latter to nuisance complaints.33 In response to this argument, scholars have 
pointed out that keeping non-industrial uses out of manufacturing zones is too drastic a 
measure to deal with this situation.34 As this Article explains in Part II.A, there are other 
ways of addressing the nuisance-type problems that may arise in mixed-use districts.35 The 
second argument in support of noncumulative zoning is that allowing residential uses in 
manufacturing districts—as cumulative zoning would permit—would drive up the price 
of the land, pushing industrial users out of the city.36 In response to that claim, some com-
mentators have argued that using noncumulative zoning for such purposes—i.e., as a sub-
sidy aimed at maintaining industry within city limits—is inefficient and lacks transparency 
because it makes it very complicated for the public to know the actual cost of the subsidy.37 
In addition to challenging the arguments supporting noncumulative zoning, scholars 
have also noted the problems that this form of zoning can lead to. One author concludes 
                                                          
 26. See 12 N.Y. JUR. 2d Buildings § 217 (2016). 
 27. Id.  
 28. David Schleicher, City Unplanning, 122 YALE L.J. 1670, 1681 (2013). 
 29. Id. 
 30. 12 N.Y. JUR. 2d Buildings § 217 (2016). 
 31. Hills & Schleicher, supra note 11, at 254. In New York City, for example, the statement of general pur-
poses in the Zoning Resolution shows the concern for maintaining industrial uses in New York City: “These 
general goals include, among others, the following specific purposes: (a) To provide sufficient space, in appro-
priate locations, to meet the needs of the City’s expected future economy for all types of manufacturing and 
related activities, with due allowance for the need for a choice of sites.” N.Y.C., N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION § 
41-00 (1961). There are three types of manufacturing districts: M1 (Light Manufacturing Districts), M2 (Medium 
Manufacturing Districts), and M3 (Heavy Manufacturing Districts). Id. §§ 41-11 to -13. Consistently with this 
idea of protecting industry, the Zoning Resolution adopts a noncumulative zoning approach which excludes res-
idential completely from M2 and M3. Id. §§ 41-12 to -13. 
 32. Hills & Schleicher, supra note 11, at 255, 272. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See infra Part II.A. 
 36. Hills  & Schleicher, supra note 11, at 255. 
 37. Schleicher, supra note 28, at 1724. 
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that “[w]hat started out as a noble intention to protect the health of citizens and improve 
the quality of life in the urban environment may have done just the opposite by fostering 
the sprawling pattern of today’s cities.”38 Sprawl, in turn, can harm the environment, create 
automobile dependence, and cause racial segregation in inner cities.39 In light of these 
criticisms, it is not surprising to see a surge in initiatives seeking to increase the creation 
of mixed-use districts.40 
B. Performance Zoning 
Another concept that is closely tied to the notion of mixed-use districts is perfor-
mance zoning. As noted above, conventional zoning, which divides the territory into use 
districts to ensure that uses deemed incompatible are physically separated from each other, 
has been criticized on various grounds.41 Commentators have argued that conventional 
zoning inflates the price of housing, creates delays, and imposes excessive costs on devel-
opers.42 A potential alternative to conventional zoning that has been acquiring momentum 
is performance zoning, which instead of limiting the uses in a particular district, focuses 
on the impacts of the different activities.43 In other words, whether a certain use may be 
located in a particular district depends on the impact that it will cause on the area, rather 
than on its use category, such as residential or manufacturing. 
It is worth noting that, while some municipalities have eliminated conventional zon-
ing completely and replaced it with performance zoning, others have adopted a hybrid 
system.44 The so-called “Kendig model,” for example, still separates incompatible uses 
into different districts, but, within each mixed-use district, it employs performance stand-
ards to limit the negative impacts of certain uses upon others.45 In the Kendig model, one 
way of separating incompatible uses that are located in the same district are “bufferyards,” 
which place a barrier between the two or more potentially conflicting uses.46 Regardless 
of whether we are talking about a “pure” or a hybrid system, performance zoning schemes 
have two common traits: (1) they give a landowner more leeway when deciding to what 
use she can dedicate the land, and (2) they place the emphasis on performance standards.47 
In the noise context, performance standards generally adopt the form of maximum noise 
levels with which activities must comply.48 
Different authors have praised the virtues of performance zoning. From the perspec-
tive of the landowner, performance zoning allows a broader range of uses for the land, 
                                                          
 38. Lamer, supra note 21, at 395. 
 39. Wayne Batchis, Enabling Urban Sprawl: Revisiting the Supreme Court’s Seminal Zoning Decision Eu-
clid v. Ambler in the 21st Century, 17 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 373, 375 (2010). 
 40. See sources cited supra note 24.  
 41. As explained above, this feature of conventional zoning is more salient in the case of noncumulative 
zoning, but it also applies to some extent to cumulative zoning, which still prohibits industrial uses in residential 
zones. See infra Part II.A. See also Frederick W. Acker, Note, Performance Zoning, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
363, 366 (1991). 
 42. Id. at 366–67. 
 43. ARDEN H. RATHKOPF ET AL., RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 21:67 (4th ed. 2016). 
 44. 1 ZONING & PLANNING DESKBOOK § 2:13 (2d ed. 2016). 
 45. Acker, supra note 41, at 372. 
 46. Id. at 373. 
 47. 1 ZONING & PLANNING DESKBOOK § 2:13 (2d ed. 2016). 
 48. Further detail on the nature of performance standards is provided infra in Part II.B. 
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which in turn may increase its value.49 Further, commentators have noted that municipal 
governments also benefit from performance zoning because, by permitting landowners to 
use their land in a more flexible and economically efficient way, the tax base increases.50 
In short, mixed-use districts—regardless of whether they are created under a cumu-
lative zoning or performance approach, or not—are becoming increasingly popular.51 
While this Article does not take a position on the desirability of these types of districts, it 
does claim that areas that are following this approach should have regulatory systems that 
are well suited to dealing with some of the problems that mixed-use districts can generate. 
As different studies have shown, one challenge that mixed-use districts present is the issue 
of noise.52 Performance standards offer one possible avenue.53 However, for standards of 
performance to be a good solution, they must have the necessary sophistication to control 
noise both effectively and efficiently. The next sections will examine the different ways in 
which noise in urban areas can be addressed, as well as some of the potential avenues for 
improving the existing local frameworks. 
II. NOISE REGULATION AT THE LOCAL LEVEL 
A. Noise and Federalism 
1. Federal Noise Regulation 
The only significant attempt by the federal government to regulate noise was through 
the Noise Control Act of 1972.54 The Environmental Protection Agency created the Office 
of Noise Abatement and Control to carry out “a full and complete investigation and study 
of noise and its effect on the public health and welfare.”55 The goals that the statute en-
trusted to the Office were the following: 
(1) identify and classify causes and sources of noise, and (2) determine—(A) effects 
at various levels; (B) projected growth of noise levels in urban areas through the 
year 2000; (C) the psychological and physiological effect on humans; (D) effects 
of sporadic extreme noise (such as jet noise near airports) as compared with con-
stant noise; (E) effect on wildlife and property (including values); (F) effect of sonic 
booms on property (including values); and (G) such other matters as may be of 
interest in the public welfare.56 
A few years later, Congress enacted the Quiet Communities Act of 1978, which amended 
the Noise Control Act and was directed at providing more tools to state and local govern-
ments.57 The federal noise program, however, was short-lived. In 1982, the federal gov-
ernment decided that state and local governments were in a better position to handle noise 
                                                          
 49. 1 ZONING & PLANNING DESKBOOK § 2:13 (2d ed. 2016). 
 50. Id. 
 51. See sources cited supra note 24.  
 52. Dana L. Brown & Lee White, Noise: A Land Use Dilemma? A Case Study of the City of Jacksonville, 
FLA. B.J., Nov. 2009, at 52, 53.  
 53. Lamer, supra note 21, at 403. 
 54. Pub. L. No. 91-604, 86 Stat. 1234 (1972); Brautigam, supra note 15, at 425. 
 55. 42 U.S.C. § 7641(a).  
 56. § 7641(a). 
 57. Paula P. Bentley, Comment, A Line in the Sand: Florida Municipalities Struggle to Determine the Line 
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issues.58 As a result, while the provisions of the Noise Control Act of 1972 remain in place, 
the EPA progressively reduced the Office of Noise Abatement and Control’s funding.59 
States and local governments reacted by taking the lead and creating ways to address noise 
pollution.60 
2. Noise Control at the State Level: Nuisance and Regulation 
Tort law has traditionally dealt with noise through the doctrine of nuisance.61 This 
doctrine dates back to, at least, the twelfth century,62 but its basic principles had been rec-
ognized in Roman law long before that time.63 In addition, states have also enacted various 
types of regulations to address noise problems.64 A detailed explanation of how these reg-
ulations operate is provided in Part II.C. For the purposes of this discussion, however, 
suffice it to say that noise control frameworks generally incorporate one of two types of 
standards.65 First, emission standards limit the level of noise that a source generates, and 
compliance is measured in close proximity to the source.66 Second, immission standards 
address the noise levels to which people are exposed, and, thus, are generally measured 
farther away from the source and near where the potentially affected people are located.67 
The next two sections explore the principles of nuisance, as applied to noise, and the debate 
over whether regulation or tort is a more adequate way to deal with this problem. 
a. Nuisance 
The doctrine of nuisance finds its “modern incarnation” in the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts.68 Section 821A lays out the two types of nuisance: public nuisance and private 
nuisance.69 While, theoretically, both are potentially relevant when examining the issue of 
noise pollution, plaintiffs tend to use the doctrine of public nuisance less frequently be-
cause it presents some additional hurdles to those bringing the action.70 
The Restatement defines private nuisance as “a nontrespassory invasion of another’s 
                                                          
Between Valid Noise Ordinances and Unconstitutional Restrictions, 35 STETSON L. REV. 461, 468–69 (2006).   
 58. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA History: Noise and the Noise Control Act, https://www.epa.gov/history/epa-
history-noise-and-noise-control-act (last visited June 17, 2017) [hereinafter EPA History]. 
 59. Shapiro, supra note 13, at 20; EPA History, supra note 58.  
 60. Brautigam, supra note 15, at 425. 
 61. Id. at 417.  
 62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D cmt. a. (AM. LAW INST. 1979).  
 63. See Melius De Villiers, Nuisances in Roman Law, 13 L. Q. REV. 387, 387 (1897) (explaining that “[t]here 
is no term in Roman Law corresponding to the English word ‘nuisance’ [but] there are certain rules of law in the 
legislation of Justinian that to a considerable extent are in agreement with the principles of English law relative 
to the subject indicated by that word.”). 
 64. See, e.g., OR. ADMIN. R. 340-035-0005 (2015). For more examples, see infra Part II.C.  
 65. In some cases, they use both. See, e.g., OR. ADMIN. R. 340-035-025, -35 (2015) (imposing limitations on 
the noise generated by automobiles while also requiring “industrial or commercial sources” not exceed the “am-
bient statistical noise levels.”). 
 66. See infra Part II.B.  
 67. See infra Part II.B. 
 68. See Thomas W. Merrill, Is Public Nuisance a Tort?, 4 J. TORT L. 1, 4 (2011).  
 69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821 et seq. (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
 70. Dunlap, supra note 16, at 68. However, there are some cases in which plaintiffs have brought public 
nuisance lawsuits in the noise context and have been successful at obtaining relief. See, e.g., New York v. Wa-
terloo Stock Car Raceway, Inc., 409 N.Y.S.2d 40, 45 (Sup. Ct. 1978).  
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interest in the private use and enjoyment of land.”71 For liability for private nuisance to 
arise, the invasion must be “intentional and unreasonable.”72 An intentional invasion is 
unreasonable if any of the following two factors are present. First, if “the gravity of the 
harm outweighs the utility of the actor’s conduct,” which courts determine using a multi-
factor balancing test.73 Even if this balancing favors the actor, a court may still find a 
nuisance under the second factor. The second factor, which applies to serious harms only, 
is met when “the [actor’s] financial burden of compensating for this and similar harm to 
others” would not jeopardize the continuation of the activity.74 In other words, even if the 
utility of the actor’s conduct is greater than the harm, the Restatement still favors imposing 
liability in cases in which a certain activity is causing a harm that is serious, as long as 
requiring the owner of such activity to compensate the aggrieved party would not affect 
the viability of the activity.75 
While both factors lead to a finding that a certain activity is a nuisance, it is important 
to stress that the remedy that a court could provide to the plaintiff in these two scenarios 
is different. In the first case—where the gravity of the harm exceeds the utility of the con-
duct—the court could grant an injunction.76 In the second scenario, however, the default 
remedy would be for the court to impose damages on the offending party.77 The reason 
that supports this different approach is that, while an injunction has the purpose and effect 
of stopping the activity, the award of damages would merely “place on the activity the cost 
of compensating for the harm it causes.”78 
In the case of disputes related to noise pollution, the balancing test that determines 
whether a court should grant an injunction may ultimately hinge upon how socially valu-
able the activity causing the annoyance is perceived to be. Two examples illustrate how 
this balancing test operates in practice. In the case of an airport, the decision to grant an 
injunction will depend on “the social value of aviation and the need for air transportation,” 
and how it compares to the harm derived from such activity.79 It is possible to see how a 
large airport, given its social value, could justify granting the plaintiffs damages instead 
of an injunction. However, some recreational activities such as a racetrack have been 
                                                          
 71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
 72. Id. § 822. If it is unintentional, it is actionable if it meets the requirements for negligence or strict liability. 
See id.  
 73. Id. §§ 827, 828. 
 74. Id. § 826. 
 75. Id. § 826 cmt. f. 
 76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
 77. Id. § 826. The original rule in some states was that once a nuisance had been found, and the harm caused 
was substantial, the activity would be enjoined even if the economic effects of the injunction on its owner were 
greater than those caused by the activity upon the plaintiff. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 872 
(N.Y. 1970). The problem with this approach was illustrated by the situation in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement, where 
the sum of the damages to all plaintiffs was approximately $185,000, id. at 874, while granting an injunction 
would have stopped a plant that cost in excess of $45 million and employed over 300 people, id. at 874 n.*. In 
that case, the Court of Appeals of New York decided to adopt a rule consistent with that currently in the Restate-
ment and granted an injunction that would be vacated upon payment by the plaintiff of permanent damages to 
the defendants. In sum, under the rule in the Restatement and Boomer v. Atlantic Cement, the burden that the 
plaintiff must bear to obtain damages—that the harm is serious and compensation would not be fatal for the 
activity—is lower than that required for an injunction—that the balance between harm and utility tips in favor of 
the former. 
 78. Id.  
 79. Id. 
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treated differently by the case law—and therefore enjoined—based on the argument that 
the harm they created was greater than their social value, which was perceived to be rela-
tively low.80 
b. Nuisance v. Regulation 
Noise control has not been left out of the debate over whether tort liability or regu-
lation is better suited to deal with potentially harmful activities.81 This question is espe-
cially relevant at the state level, where legislatures have the opportunity to favor one alter-
native over the other.82 One theoretical framework that is particularly useful when 
examining this dichotomy in the context of noise is the model created by Steven Shavell.83 
It starts by describing tort as private in nature and explaining that it relies on the deterrent 
effect of a potential future legal action for damages after the harm has occurred, and con-
trasts it with regulation, which is public in character and attempts to prevent the occurrence 
of the harm in the first place.84 It then provides four factors to aid in determining the “rel-
ative desirability” of liability or regulation.85 
The first factor relates to “the possibility of a difference in knowledge about risky 
activities as between private parties and a regulatory authority.”86 In other words, if private 
parties have better knowledge of their benefits, the probability of occurrence of harm, its 
severity, and the costs of preventing it, then liability should be favored over regulation.87 
Private parties will have more information thereby allowing them to set the risk at the level 
that maximizes social welfare, and the threat of being sued will serve as an incentive to act 
consistently with such information.88 In the case of noise-generating industrial facilities, 
their operators may have a better knowledge of their benefits and the costs of reducing 
                                                          
 80. In New York v. Waterloo Stock Car Raceway, for example, a New York court enjoined the operation of a 
racetrack and distinguished Atlantic Cement based on the fact that the benefits in this case were lower—the 
facility only employed “a few people.” New York v. Waterloo Stock Car Raceway, Inc., 409 N.Y.S.2d 40, 45 
(Sup. Ct. 1978). 
 81. One author suggests creating a new “product-nuisance” tort which would allow courts to impose liability 
upon a manufacturer regardless of whether there is physical harm and even if the manufacturer does not control 
the instrumentality. Lief, supra note 14, at 642. Another author, however, proposes to provide a solution for car 
“horn use and abuse” based on a new regulatory framework under which the government would create a metering 
system that would allow enforcement officials to “measure actual horn use.” Brautigam, supra note 15, at 434. 
82.The federal government is mostly limited to creating new regulatory frameworks, as are the municipali-
ties, due to the fact that nuisance is primarily a matter of state law. See JEFFREY MILLER ET AL., INTRODUCTION 
TO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: CASES & MATERIALS ON WATER POLLUTION CONTROL 19, 21 (2008) (explaining, 
in the context of the common law of nuisance, that “common law is a creature of state law,” although there are 
some limited areas in which the Supreme Court has recognized the existence of federal nuisance law). 
 83. Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEG. STUD. 357, 357 (1984). Other 
authors have focused the analysis on whether courts or agencies are better positioned to deal with certain risks. 
See Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1027, 1061 (1990); 
Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. 
REV. 277, 331 (1985). 
 84. Shavell, supra note 83, at 357. 
 85. Id. While the framework that this scholar developed to determine “the relative desirability” of liability or 
regulation refers specifically to “safety” and not the annoyance or inconvenience that noise typically causes, 
some of the factors that he considered in his analysis are also useful when examining the issue of noise pollution, 
as the following discussion will show.  
 86. Id. at 359. 
 87. Id.  
 88. Id. 
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noise, but a regulator may know more about the harm that the noise is causing to third 
parties or the likelihood of its occurrence. Still, while a regulator may have less infor-
mation on the benefits of the activity and the cost of certain noise-reduction devices ap-
plied to a particular facility, the regulator may know the general costs of the noise control 
technologies that are available in the market. This factor does not clearly favor one system 
over the other. 
The second factor to consider is the notion that “private parties may be incapable of 
paying for the full magnitude of the harm done.”89 In the noise context, this part of the 
analysis is not particularly relevant. As explained above, the most common effects of noise 
are annoyance and inconvenience, rather than latent or catastrophic harm.90 
The third factor that may influence the assessment of whether regulation or liability 
is a more appropriate way of dealing with noise is “the chance that parties would not face 
the threat of suit for harm done,” and that, therefore, the reduced deterrence would lead 
the operator to set the risk level too high.91 With noise pollution, the threat of being sued 
is likely related to the magnitude of the harm to each particular person. Thus, if an indus-
trial facility is preventing people living in the vicinity of the plant from sleeping at night, 
carrying out other important activities, or causing high blood pressure, then the likelihood 
that they will sue the industrial operator will be high.92 If, on the other hand, as a result of 
the zoning in a particular locality, the facility is located far away from residences, each 
affected person may be receiving some moderate inconvenience not worth suing over. If 
the number of affected people is high, the total magnitude of the harm would be important. 
However, the owner of the plant may not take into account the harm that it is causing 
because the likelihood of a suit is low. In these situations, liability may lead to suboptimal 
results. 
The last factor is “the magnitude of the administrative costs incurred by private par-
ties and by the public in using the tort system or direct regulation.”93 As Shavell notes, this 
factor will generally weigh in favor of liability because, under that system, costs are only 
incurred when there is a harm.94 In the case of regulation, the costs are sustained even if 
there is no harm at all.95 
This analysis—where two factors point in a different direction and the other two are 
inconclusive—suggests that neither liability nor regulation is clearly superior to the other 
alternative. In light of this, it is important to point out that the two systems are not mutually 
exclusive, and that, in fact, some balance between the two—which will vary depending on 
the nature of the risk—may be the optimal solution.96 This is consistent with the current 
state of affairs in many jurisdictions: many states have noise-control statutes or regulations 
                                                          
 89. Shavell, supra note 83, at 360. 
 90. However, it is not impossible to envision a scenario under which the award of damages for past disturb-
ances would be too high for an industrial operator to afford, especially if there are multiple affected parties. 
 91. Shavell, supra note 83, at 363. 
 92. This risk of being sued, however, will not be high if those harmed do not have the necessary resources to 
bring a lawsuit.  
 93. Shavell, supra note 83, at 364. 
 94. Id.  
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
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that give agencies enforcement authority, as well as common law causes of action availa-
ble to those aggrieved by noise who find it appropriate to take the issue to court.97 
3. Local Regulation 
States may delegate to municipalities, through express grants or home rule provi-
sions, the authority to enact ordinances to regulate noise.98 These ordinances generally rely 
on the local government’s authority to protect the public health, welfare, and safety of its 
citizens.99 Many municipalities in the United States, major cities in particular, have en-
acted noise control ordinances of some sort.100 
While, as explained above, states have different and powerful tools to deal with noise 
pollution, this Article will focus on noise control at the local level. This Article is particu-
larly concerned with the noise problems that the creation of mixed-use districts can bring 
about, which partly results from the potential for certain uses to cause negative impacts on 
others. This is more likely to occur in some municipalities more than in others, depending 
on whether they encourage the creation of mixed-use districts. In other words, although 
the recommendations contained in Part III of this Article can be used for any kind of noise 
ordinance or even state statute, municipalities interested in promoting mixed-use districts 
will be able to benefit from these improvements to a greater extent. As a result, the decision 
on how necessary it is to improve the current noise control framework to advance the goal 
of creating more mixed-use districts is one that each municipality will make inde-
pendently, based on its own needs and preferences. 
In any event, it is important to point out that ordinances will, in many instances, have 
to coexist with state common law and, in some cases, with statewide noise control regula-
tory frameworks. This can create two types of tensions. First, some state statutes limit local 
government’s ability to set its own noise standards freely. This can occur, for example, 
when a state statute only allows the local government to set standards that are at least as 
stringent as those contained in the statute.101 The extent to which this will be a problem 
depends on how stringent these state standards are. Second, nuisance suits could under-
mine certain positive features of noise ordinances. Modern noise ordinances tend to have 
numerical noise standards—generally expressed in decibels— which provides certainty to 
all the regulated community.102 However, someone could bring a nuisance suit against a 
party whose activities are generating noise, even though that noise complies with the stand-
ards in the ordinance. Fortunately, courts have already been dealing with this issue by 
                                                          
 97. See ROBERT C. CHANAUD, NOISE ORDINANCES: TOOLS FOR ENACTMENT, MODIFICATION AND 
ENFORCEMENT OF A COMMUNITY NOISE ORDINANCE A-2 (2014), https://www.noisefree.org/Noise-Ordinance-
Manual.pdf (providing several examples of states that have enacted noise control statutes and regulations). For 
examples of state courts recognizing the cause of action for nuisance in noise cases, see Schneider Nat’l Carriers, 
Inc. v. Bates, 147 S.W.3d 264, 269 (Tex. 2004); Toyo Tire North Am. Mfg., Inc. v. Davis, 299 Ga. 155, 162, 
167–68 (2016); New York v. Waterloo Stock Car Raceway, Inc., 409 N.Y.S.2d 40, 45 (Sup. Ct. 1978). 
 98. Brautigam, supra note 15, at 427. 
 99. See, e.g., LOS ANGELES COUNTY, CAL., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 12.08.20.B (1978); PORTLAND, OR., 
CODE § 18.02.020 (2001). 
 100. See infra Part II.C.  
 101. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1G-21 (West 1971).  
 102. See infra Part II.C. For a discussion about the ways in which less modern ordinances framed noise limi-
tations and the legal problems that this generated, see Bentley, supra note 57, at 484–85.  
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taking into account regulatory limits when applying the doctrine of nuisance,103 which 
limits the magnitude of the problem.104 
B. The Basic Principles of Noise Regulation 
Noise-control regulatory frameworks are similar to regulations that address other 
forms of pollution in many ways.105 Thus, when analyzing noise-control frameworks, it is 
helpful to keep in mind the basic principles and traditional categories of regulatory tools 
that are generally found in most types of pollution-control regulations. Two of these clas-
sifications are of particular relevance in the context of noise pollution control: (1) the dif-
ference between design and performance standards, and (2) the emission/immission di-
chotomy. 
Regulatory standards can be divided into design standards and performance stand-
ards.106 Design standards specify the particular technology that an industry must use to 
reduce pollution.107 In other words, with a pure design standard, the operator meets the 
standard by merely using that technology, regardless of the final degree of pollution re-
duction that it achieves. A performance standard, on the other hand, requires an “emission 
rate or other measure of performance to be attained,” leaving the decision of what tech-
nology to employ to the regulated entity.108 Initially, zoning regulations subjected indus-
tries to design standards, such as maximum heights for smokestacks and provisions regu-
lating building materials.109 During the 1950s and 1960s, however, manufacturing district 
regulations started exploring a different approach focused on the result rather than on the 
means: industrial performance standards.110 Noise regulations can potentially incorporate 
both types of standards. A requirement that certain motor vehicles be equipped with spe-
cific devices to attenuate noise would fit into the design standard category, while limiting 
the number of decibels that a certain activity can generate would be an example of a per-
formance standard. Given that this Article’s primary concern is minimizing the impacts of 
activities in mixed-use districts, the following discussion will focus on performance stand-
ards, which are results oriented.111 
The other useful distinction is between regulations that attempt to control pollution 
by measuring emission and those that focus on immission. As one author explains, the 
difference between emission and immission is that the latter focuses on the reception.112 
Stated differently, pollution is emitted by a source, it is then transmitted (through the air), 
                                                          
 103. See, e.g., Smith v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 436 F.Supp. 151 (E.D. Tenn. 1977). 
 104. For a discussion of the problem with nuisance suits in areas in which municipalities would allow high 
levels of noise, see Hills & Schleicher, supra note 11, at 257–60. 
 105. For example, they have to take into account the competing interests at stake and consider the health im-
pacts of industrial activities on people and the environment.   
 106. Timothy F. Malloy & Peter Sinsheimer, Innovation, Regulation and the Selection Environment, 57 
RUTGERS L. REV. 183, 196 (2004). 
 107. Id.  
 108. Timothy F. Malloy, The Social Construction of Regulation: Lessons from the War Against Command and 
Control, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 267, 284 (2010). 
 109. Acker, supra note 41, at 370. 
 110. Id. 
 111. The connection between zoning and standards of performance is addressed in more depth in Part I.B. 
 112. TJEERT TEN WOLDE, THE EUROPEAN POLICY AND LEGISLATION ON ENVIRONMENTAL NOISE 2 (2005), 
http://www.ince-j.or.jp/old/05/05_page/05_doc/policyEU.pdf. 
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and it finally reaches a particular receiver.113 Emission standards address what happens at 
the source (by, for example, requiring that an air pollutant not exceed a certain concentra-
tion when it exits a smokestack), whereas immission limitations are concerned with the 
levels of pollution that will be experienced by the receivers (by, for instance, monitoring 
the concentration of an air pollutant in the middle of a park).114 This distinction originated 
in the context of air pollution and was later borrowed by noise regulations.115 Determining 
in which of these two categories a particular regulation should be included can be tricky 
in certain situations, as will be explained below.116 In other cases, however, it is easier to 
make that differentiation. The New York City Noise Code, for example, employs both. 
Sound produced by refuse vehicles, for example, is measured at a distance of thirty-five 
feet or more from the source, i.e., where the receiver of that noise could be situated.117 In 
the case of machinery such as air compressors, the New York City Noise Code requires 
that the sound be measured at a distance of one meter from the compressor, i.e., where the 
source, rather than the potential receiver, is located.118 
C. Types of Noise Ordinances 
The following examples are intended to illustrate common types of frameworks and 
provisions that are found in noise control ordinances of cities across the United States. The 
first part of the analysis will examine immission ordinances—i.e., those limiting the noise 
that reaches receivers—by describing its two main types: (1) matrix and (2) non-matrix 
frameworks. The second set of examples will focus on emission-control provisions—i.e., 
those controlling the noise at the location of the source. 
1. Immission Ordinances: Matrix System 
The City of Portland, Oregon, has a very sophisticated noise ordinance that sets noise 
standards in decibels, which is the unit that is generally employed to measure sound pres-
sure.119 By way of reference, rustling leaves generate twenty decibels, a quiet room in your 
home is forty decibels, a conversation in an unusually loud background is around sixty 
decibels, and a jackhammer or noisy factory can cause noises of ninety decibels.120 
The ordinance includes noise standards for each of the four land-use zone categories: 
(1) residential, (2) open space, (3) commercial, and (4) industrial.121 What makes this sys-
tem a matrix, however, is that the maximum sound level that these zones can receive also 
                                                          
 113. Id. 
 114. The Clean Air Act provides examples of these two types of frameworks. Limitations on hazardous air 
pollutants under section 112 focus on the emission generated by a specified source. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c)(2) 
(2010). Ambient air quality standards, on the other hand, set maximum immission levels for certain pollutants. § 
7412. 
 115. WOLDE, supra note 112, at 2. 
 116. See infra Part II.C.3.  
 117. N.Y.C., N.Y., NOISE CODE § 24-225 (2005). 
 118. N.Y.C., N.Y., NOISE CODE § 24-226 (2005). 
 119. PORTLAND, OR., CODE § 18.10.010.A (2010) (using the A-weighting network); Hansen, supra note 1, at 
30–33. 
 120. ENGINEERING TOOLBOX, Sound Pressure, http://www.engineeringtoolbox.com/sound-pressure-
d_711.html (last visited July 26, 2017). 
 121. PORTLAND, OR., CODE § 18.10.010. A (2010). 
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varies depending on the zone in which the source is located.122 The following figure shows 




Zone Categories of Receiver (measured at property line) 
Residential Open Space Commercial Industrial 
Residential 55 55 60 65 
Open Space 55 55 60 65 
Commercial 60 60 70 70 
Industrial  65 65 70 75 
Table 1123 
 
It is important to note that, while this framework takes into account the location of 
the source, it is still an immission-type regulation. What determines whether an ordinance 
limits emission or immission is the location where noise levels are measured.124 In the case 
of Portland’s ordinance, even though the location of the source is taken into account to 
determine which standard will apply, compliance with these standards is always measured 
on the property of the receiver, as opposed to that of the source.125 
The ordinance also includes a series of adjustments that can modify these maximum 
sound levels. The values in Table 1 apply from 7 a.m. to 10 p.m. During the so-called 
“night hours” (after 10 p.m. and before 7 a.m.), the sound levels are reduced by five deci-
bels.126 Moreover, sounds that present frequency characteristics that could threaten the 
public health, welfare, or safety of the city’s citizens are subjected to a maximum decibel 
level that is more stringent than that in Table 1.127 
2. Immission Ordinances: Non-Matrix System 
The noise control ordinance of the County of Los Angeles provides a good example 
of a non-matrix immission system. Similar to the Portland noise ordinance, the Los Ange-
les local regulations create four noise zones: (1) noise-sensitive areas, (2) residential prop-
erties, (3) commercial properties, and (4) industrial properties.128 Because it is an immis-
sion framework, compliance with the noise standards is measured on the receiver’s 
property.129 Unlike in Portland, however, there is one maximum noise level per noise zone; 
the standards do not change based on the type of source it comes from.130 Thus, the result-
ing maximum noise level table is simpler, as shown below. 
 
Designated Noise Zone Land Use Exterior Noise Level (dB) 
Noise-Sensitive Area 45 
Residential Properties 45 
                                                          
 122. § 18.10.010. A. 
 123. § 18.10.010. A. 
 124. See supra Part II.B.  
 125. PORTLAND, OR., CODE § 18.10.010. A (2010). 
 126. § 18.10.010. B. 
 127. §§ 18.10.010. B, G. 
 128. LOS ANGELES COUNTY, CAL., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 12.08.390 A (1978).  
 129. § 12.08.390 A. 
 130. § 12.08.390 A. 
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Commercial Properties 55 
Industrial Properties 70 
Table 2131 
3. Emission Ordinances 
While pure emission noise ordinances are not very common, some large cities in the 
United States do have noise control provisions that predominantly focus on emission. New 
York and San Diego offer examples of this. 
New York City has a wide variety of noise regulations. They can be grouped into 
three main categories: the provisions in the New York City Zoning Resolution, the New 
York City Noise Code, and the New York City Environmental Quality Review.132 The 
most relevant regulations for the purposes of this discussion about the emission/immission 
dichotomy are those found in the New York City Zoning Resolution.133 The Zoning Res-
olution limits the noise caused by activities located in manufacturing districts, which can 
include different types of uses, including commercial and residential.134 The specific 
standards vary slightly for each manufacturing district (M1, M2, or M3) and take into 
account not only the decibels of the noise, but also its frequency.135 The applicable limits 
are the following: 
 
Octave Band  
(cycles per second) 
Maximum Sound Pressure Level Permitted (in decibels) 
M1 M2 M3 
20 – 75 79 79 80 
75 – 150 74 75 75 
150 – 300 66 68 70 
300 – 600 59 62 64 
600 – 1200 53 56 58 
1200 – 2400 47 51 53 
2400 – 4800 41 47 49 
Above 4800 39 44 46 
Table 3136 
 
The question of whether a particular provision controls emission or immission de-
pends on the language used to specify where—location of the source or of the receiver—
the compliance with the noise maximum level is to be determined. Section 42-213 of the 
Zoning Resolution limits the maximum decibels generated by any activity, measured “at 
any point on or beyond any lot line.”137 This wording would suggest that this is both an 
emission and an immission provision. If the noise is measured on the property line, it is 
                                                          
 131. § 12.08.390. 
 132. WEIXIONG WU, UPDATED NOISE REGULATIONS IN NEW YORK CITY 1 (2008), http://www.bower-
yevents.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/NYC-Noise-Regulations.pdf.  
 133. N.Y.C., N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION §§ 42-21 to -214 (1961). 
 134. §§ 42-02, -213. The zoning resolution also contains other miscellaneous provisions dealing with noise, 
such as section 123-32, which requires new dwelling units located in a Special Mixed Use District to meet certain 
window wall attenuation requirements. 
 135. § 42-213. 
 136. § 42-213. 
 137. § 42-213 (emphasis added). 
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being evaluated at the source, and therefore it is looking at emission. If, however, compli-
ance with the maximum sound level is measured at some point beyond the source’s prop-
erty boundary, and where a receiver may potentially be located, the provision would be 
limiting immission. 
The reason why this is predominantly an emission provision is that the emission 
standard is the most restrictive one. Except in very rare circumstances, the noise measured 
beyond the property line will be lower than the noise level on the property line.138 Thus, if 
a receiver takes issue with the noise generated by an activity, what will ultimately deter-
mine whether the source is violating the standard or not is the noise level on the property 
line. Even if this receiver is experiencing a noise that is below the limit set by the Zoning 
Resolution, she may still be able to have local authorities intervene, as long as the noise 
level on the source’s property line exceeds the noise standard. 
As another author has pointed out, the provisions of the San Diego Municipal Code 
dealing with noise abatement and control also adopt an emission approach.139 However, 
as with the New York City Zoning Resolution, it is rather a mixed system in which the 
emission component predominates. The relevant section of the San Diego Municipal Code 
reads “[i]t shall be unlawful . . . to cause noise . . . [that] exceeds the applicable limit . . . 
at any location in the City of San Diego on or beyond the boundaries of the property on 
which the noise is produced.”140 Again, the “on or beyond” language is consistent with 
both immission and emission frameworks but, for the reasons explained in the previous 
paragraph, the emission component will be the one ultimately determining whether a 
source is complying with the standards in the ordinance or not. 
III. DESIRABLE FEATURES OF NOISE ORDINANCES 
Part II.C proposed a classification of noise ordinances—emission and immission, 
with matrix and non-matrix approaches—and identified some features that serve to further 
differentiate these frameworks, such as adjustments based on frequencies or times of the 
day. Against this background, Part III seeks to examine the desirability of these different 
options. The ultimate goal is to evaluate which of these features can make the coexistence 
of diverse uses in the same district more viable, considering the needs of all the parties 
involved. The following sections will compare different types of ordinances and assess 
whether an ordinance with a certain feature, such as adjustment of noise standards to ac-
count for annoyance, would lead to a better outcome than one without it.141 
A. Varying Noise Limits Depending on Time and Day 
One feature that some noise ordinances have but that others—even in big cities—do 
                                                          
 138. Noise decreases with distance. See ENGINEERING TOOLBOX, Inverse Square Rule, http://www.engineer-
ingtoolbox.com/inverse-square-law-d_890.html (last visited July 26, 2017) (“A doubling of the distance from a 
noise source will reduce the sound pressure level with 6 decibel.”). 
 139. CHANAUD, supra note 97, at A-17.   
 140. SAN DIEGO, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 59.5.0401 (1973). 
 141. One metric that has been used to determine the desirability of certain measures in the context of risk 
producing activities is Steven Shavell’s definition of social welfare. Shavell, supra note 83, at 358–59 (Social 
welfare “equal[s] the benefits parties derive from engaging in their activities, less the sum of the costs of precau-
tions, the harms done, and the administrative expenses associated with the means of social control.”). 
18
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 53 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol53/iss1/2
2017 HOW SCIENCE CAN IMPROVE REGULATION 51 
not always incorporate is different maximum noise levels depending on the time of the 
day. The City of Portland, Oregon, for example, has a set of noise standards that apply 
from 7 a.m. to 10 p.m., but which are reduced by five decibels during the night hours, after 
10 p.m. and before 7 a.m.142 Other ordinances even divide the day into three different 
periods: day, evening, and night, with decreasing maximum noise levels.143 Surprisingly, 
not all noise control ordinances in big cities in the United States make this type of adjust-
ment.144 
The rationale for this difference in maximum noise levels depending on the time of 
the day is simple: the effect that noise has on people tends to vary throughout the day. 
During the so-called “day” hours, which generally start at around 7 a.m. for most ordi-
nances, people are more active, and their tolerance for noise is higher.145 After work, peo-
ple tend to reduce their activity and, with it, their willingness to accept noise intrusions 
diminishes, reaching a minimum at night.146 It is not surprising, in light of this, that experts 
have advised, as a ‘best management practice,’ to reduce the impact of noise produced by 
industrial sources by “scheduling the use of noisy equipment at the least-sensitive time of 
the day.”147 
From an efficiency perspective, an ordinance that accounts for these variations will 
also be superior to one that does not. As under the doctrine of nuisance, policymakers who 
set noise standards in ordinances often strike a balance—between the harm caused to the 
people who will suffer the consequences of the noise and the costs of noise-reducing 
measures that different activities will have to implement—to reach a figure that will ac-
count for the interests of both sources and receivers.148 Because the harm that a certain 
level of noise causes on people changes throughout the day, a framework that does not 
consider these differences will not be as efficient as one that does.149 
The reason why this leads to inefficiency is that an ordinance with one noise standard 
for the entire day will have set this standard at a particular level. This level will be either 
closer to the optimal balance between harm and cost at daytime or closer to the optimal 
                                                          
 142. PORTLAND, OR., CODE § 18.10.010. B (2010). 
 143. See, e.g., SAN DIEGO, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 59.5.0401 (1973). 
 144. One significant example is New York’s Zoning Resolution, which applies to industrial sources—even if 
the receivers of the sound are not industrial. N.Y.C., N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION §§ 42-21 to -214 (1961). Section 
42-214, in particular, makes an adjustment when industrial noise could affect residences—a six decibel reduc-
tion—but makes no differentiation depending on the time of the day. See § 42-214.  
 145. CHANAUD, supra note 97, at A-2, 3-17.  
 146. QUALITY PLANNING, NOISE MANAGEMENT IN MIXED-USE URBAN ENVIRONMENTS 5 (2013), 
http://www.qualityplanning.org.nz/images/documents/plan_topics/Noise/Noise_manage-
ment_in_mixed_use_urban_environments/Noise_Management_in_Mxed_Used_EnvironmentsGN.pdf.  
 147. ENV. PROT. AUTH., NSW INDUSTRIAL NOISE POLICY 38 (2000), http://www.epa.nsw.gov.au/re-
sources/noise/ind_noise.pdf. 
 148. See supra Part II.A.2.a; see also HUIB VAN ESSEN ET AL., SOUND NOISE LIMITS 13 (2005), http://ec.eu-
ropa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/modes/air/studies/doc/environment/2005_01_sound_noise_limits.pdf. For 
similar considerations in the context of noise abatement measures, see FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., DEP’T OF 
TRANSP., HIGHWAY NOISE AND ABATEMENT GUIDELINES 14 (2016), https://hidot.hawaii.gov/high-
ways/files/2016/06/hwy_l-2016-Noise-Policy-and-Approval-Letter.pdf. 
 149. In this Article, the term “efficiency” is used to illustrate this balancing between the benefits and costs of 
a noise-reducing initiative or regulation. One ordinance is more efficient than another one if it is closer to the 
optimal point where benefits are maximized and harm from noise is minimized. The specific value of this optimal 
point will depend on local conditions.  
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level at nighttime, but not both.150 This will make it overprotective or underprotective dur-
ing at least part of the day. For example, in a particular city, considering the varying sus-
ceptibility to noise and the benefits generated by noise-producing activities, the efficient 
noise limits could be sixty decibels during the day, fifty-five decibels in the evening, and 
forty-five decibels at night. A noise ordinance that has only one noise standard of fifty-
five decibels for day and night will be overregulating during the day and underregulating 
at nighttime. 
Even though incorporating different maximums for different times of the day will 
improve the ordinance, it is important to note that there are certain scenarios in which this 
will not necessarily be the case. If we are considering an immission ordinance, and there-
fore, the sound limits are set based on the use categories of the receiver, not all receivers 
will benefit from the night reduction of noise to the same extent.151 Given that nighttime 
values are lower to account for the fact that people need a reduced noise level to sleep, 
lower night standards will not be adequate in areas where people are either not present or 
are not sleeping, such as in industrial buildings.152 A good solution is one where, as the 
City of Lincoln has done, the ordinance has different noise standards for day and night in 
residential and other noise-sensitive areas, but has only one standard for the entire day for 
business and industrial uses.153 
This same analysis can be applied to similar adjustments to noise standards. While 
ordinances that have varying noise standards depending on the time of day are not uncom-
mon,154 provisions taking into account whether the noise is produced during the week or 
on the weekend are less frequent.155 This can include, for instance, modifying the times 
that are considered ‘day’ and ‘night,’ as Orlando’s noise ordinance does by modifying the 
definition of ‘day’ hours to extend it two additional hours during the weekends.156 While 
this distinction between weekdays and weekends may not be as relevant as that between 
day and night—after all, people tend to sleep at night regardless of the day of the week—
taking into account these variations may still make a particular framework more efficient, 
depending on the particular mix of uses in the district. 
In short, unfortunately, not all cities have different noise standards for different times 
of the day and days of the week. However, regulations that incorporate varying maximum 
noise levels for different times of the day and days of the week—based on people’s toler-
ance to noise—are in a better position to adequately balance the interests of noise-produc-
ing activities and the people affected by noise. For this to be true, however, local govern-
ments should only apply this principle to receiving uses that are likely to have varying 
                                                          
 150. Even if the benefits of noise stay the same, the optimal maximum noise level will vary between day and 
night hours. This is due to fact that the harm that a given level of noise causes on receivers is higher at night.   
 151. See CHANAUD, supra note 97, at 6-57. 
 152. QUALITY PLANNING, supra note 146, at 5. In the case of an emission ordinance, which focuses on the 
source, leaving only one noise standard would not solve the problem, since the industrial source could be having 
an impact on residential receivers.  
 153. LINCOLN, NEB., MUNICIPAL CODE § 8.24.090 tbl.1 (1979).  
 154. See, e.g., PORTLAND, OR., CODE § 18.10.010. B (2010); LOS ANGELES COUNTY, CAL., CODE OF 
ORDINANCES § 12.08.390 (1978); SAN DIEGO, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 59.50401 (1973). 
 155. Portland’s ordinance, for example, only takes it into account for particular kinds of sources. Compare 
PORTLAND, OR., CODE § 18.10.010 (2010), with § 18.10.035.B.  
 156. ORLANDO, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 42.03 chart 1 (2009) (adjusting its Class B standards based on 
the day of the week).  
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sensitivities to noise depending on the day or time—residential—but not to those in which 
the tolerance to noise is more likely to remain constant, such as with industrial or certain 
commercial uses. 
B. Emission v. Immission 
While most ordinances set their noise limits for each land use category based on 
immission levels—focusing on the noise that reaches the receiver—there are still some 
ordinances that are mostly emission-based—setting maximum noise levels which are to 
be measured at the location of the source.157 Some of these emission-based ordinances 
contain language stating that the maximum noise levels must be met on the property line 
of the source or beyond.158 The existence of both immission and  emission frameworks 
begs the question of which of these approaches is preferable. 
1. The Case for Immission Frameworks 
Immission systems have one major advantage over those based on emission: they 
allow for a better balance between noise-reduction costs and harm to potential receivers of 
the noise. This results from the fact that emission systems cannot, due to how they operate, 
adequately take into account the magnitude of the harm. 
Emission provisions require that sound levels be measured at the lot line, but this is 
not necessarily a good proxy for the noise level that the receiver will perceive, which is 
the basis to correctly determine the magnitude of the harm.159 In emission frameworks, if 
the closest sensitive receiver is far away or protected by a sound barrier, an industrial fa-
cility that complies with the standard may be reducing the sound level more than is neces-
sary—the receiver is being exposed to a level of noise much lower than the standard re-
quires. Conversely, if the factory is located across a narrow street from an apartment 
building, the level of noise that this residence is suffering may be too high even if the 
industry meets the appropriate noise limits on the lot line.160 By not accounting for these 
variations, an emission standard deviates from the optimal level of reduction—which, to 
correctly capture the actual harm, would have to account for the noise level that is reaching 
the receiver, rather than the noise on the source’s lot line. As a result, an emission standard 
is very likely to be too lenient or too stringent, and in any case, inefficient. 
As explained earlier, immission ordinances can be further divided into matrix and 
non-matrix frameworks, based on whether they include one maximum sound level per 
receiving category or several—one for each source type.161 As the example below shows, 
matrix models allow regulators to find a better compromise between the needs of noise-
generating sources and the wellbeing of citizens.162 
                                                          
 157. See supra notes 137 and 140 and accompanying text. 
 158. See supra notes 137 and 139 and accompanying text. 
 159. There is no harm unless the noise reaches a receiver, and the magnitude of the harm will depend on the 
particular level of noise that the receiver is experiencing (not on the noise level that exists on the property line of 
the source). 
 160. If there is no buffer or enough distance, the residences in question could be exposed to a decibel level 
very similar to limits prescribed in the Zoning Resolution, which may still be too high.  
 161. See supra Part II.C.1.  
 162. CHANAUD, supra note 97, at A-9. 
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Zone Categories of Receiver (measured at property line) 
Residential Open Space Commercial Industrial 
Residential 55 55 60 65 
Open Space 55 55 60 65 
Commercial 60 60 70 70 
Industrial 65 65 70 75 
Table 4163 
 
Non-matrix provisions have one maximum noise level for each type of receiver, re-
gardless of the noise source’s location. Matrix systems, however, by considering the type 
of source and the needs of the different receivers, allow local governments to carefully set 
their noise limits based on the importance that the different types of sources have in a 
particular municipality. Depending on the local priorities, some locations may, for exam-
ple, allow commercial uses to be the loudest, whereas others may give this privilege to 
industrial facilities. 
2. Addressing the Criticisms to Immission Frameworks 
Although immission ordinances present the major advantage of allowing for a better 
balance of the different interests at stake, at least one author has pointed out that immission 
frameworks have a drawback: they make the noise measurement more complicated as 
compared to emission ordinances.164 For example, when multiple sources are generating 
noise in an area, determining which source is causing the violation of the standard at the 
location of a particular receiver can be trickier than simply measuring emission on the lot 
line of the source. This problem is not exclusive to noise pollution. In the water context, 
for example, courts have established that a state that receives pollution from an upstream 
state may only succeed in having such state reduce its discharges if the contribution of the 
upstream state’s pollution is “detectable.”165 Another context in which this issue is frequent 
is soil pollution; in particular when multiple industrial activities pollute the same parcel of 
land.166 Both examples illustrate the complexity of attributing pollution to a particular 
source, which is also present in the area of noise pollution. 
This issue, however, is not insurmountable and can be, and, in fact, has been, effec-
tively addressed in at least two different ways in the noise context. The first solution is to 
use the background noise level as a reference.167 The background level can be defined as 
the noise immission without the contribution of the source being evaluated.168 This level 
can be measured by requiring the source to stop certain equipment temporarily or by wait-
ing and making the measurement at a time or day in which such machinery is not operating 
                                                          
 163. PORTLAND, OR., CODE § 18.10.010 A. 
 164. CHANAUD, supra note 97, at 6-5. 
 165. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992).  
 166. See Luis Inaraja Vera, Compelled Costs Under CERCLA: Incompatible Remedies, Different Statutes of 
Limitations, and Tort Law, 17 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 394, 395 (2016) (explaining the legal issues that arise in cases of 
land contamination with multiple potentially responsible parties).  
 167. Catalan noise control regulation, enacted under the umbrella of EU DIRECTIVE 2002/49 provides a good 
example of this. Decree Implementing the Provisions of Acoustic Pollution Act Preamble (D.O.G.C. 2009, 176) 
(Spain) [hereinafter Noise Decree].   
 168. Id. at Annex 3.4. 
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or is undergoing regular maintenance. Once the total noise levels with and without the 
source have been determined, the inspectors can establish the source’s contribution to the 
violation.169 The second solution is to use techniques that allow those in charge of enforce-
ment to create a map of sources based on the different frequencies of the sounds of each 
source contributing to the total noise level.170 
3. Conclusion: Immission Frameworks with Specific Emission Provisions 
For the reasons explained above, immission noise ordinances that set limits based 
on receiving land use categories are superior to those that rely on emission levels. How-
ever, local governments may also want to add an additional layer of emission standards 
for certain types of sources. As one expert notes, “good ordinances also regulate emission 
levels . . . of a number of sound sources.”171 For example, emission standards are particu-
larly useful to control the noise of mobile sources, given that the impact on a particular 
receiver can only be measured during a very brief period of time. In conclusion, in order 
for an ordinance to be able to strike an appropriate balance between the interests of noise-
generating activities and receivers, it should include a general immission framework—
with a matrix system being more desirable—and a set of specific provisions addressing 
mobile noise sources or particular types of equipment.172 
C. Annoyance 
One of the main effects of noise is annoyance, which is defined in the field of psy-
choacoustics as “any feeling of resentment, displeasure, discomfort, and irritation occur-
ring when noise intrudes into someone’s thoughts and moods or interferes with activ-
ity.”173 Surprisingly, there is not necessarily a direct relationship between loudness, 
measured in decibels, and annoyance. This direct relationship will only hold true when 
other features of the sound, such as frequency and duration, are equivalent.174 Given the 
variety of sounds to which people are exposed—which have various durations and fre-
quencies—an ordinance that effectively takes into account the effects of noise on people 
                                                          
 169. Under the Catalan regulation, if the difference between the noise when the source is operating and the 
background noise is between three and ten decibels, the latter is subtracted to determine the contribution of the 
source that is being evaluated. Id. If the noise when the industrial facility is operating is more than ten decibels 
greater than the background noise, no correction is necessary. Id. The likely reason for this rule is that, given the 
significant increase in sound pressure that ten decibels represents, the contribution of the background noise to 
the final immission is negligible. See Hansen, supra note 1, at 35 (explaining that, in cases in which the difference 
between the loudness of two sources is of ten decibels or more, “the sound source with the lower level is practi-
cally not heard.”). In cases where the difference is smaller than three decibels, the Catalan Noise Regulation 
provides that the inspectors need to make new measurements or attempt to determine the contribution of the 
multiple sources in a different manner. Noise Decree, supra note 167, at Annex 3.4.  
 170. One of these techniques is called beamforming. See BRUEL & KJAER, Acoustic Beamforming Software,  
http://www.bksv.com/Products/analysis-software/acoustics/noise-source-identification/beamforming-8608 (last 
visited Feb. 2, 2017).  
 171. CHANAUD, supra note 97, at 6-5. 
 172. See, e.g., N.Y.C., N.Y., NOISE CODE §§ 24-225, 226 (2005) (setting emission standards for refuse collec-
tion vehicles and air compressors).  
 173. W. Passchier-Vermeer & W.F. Passchier, Environmental Noise, Annoyance and Sleep Disturbance, in 
ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH IMPACTS OF TRANSPORT AND MOBILITY 28 (P. Nicolopoulou-Stamati et al. eds., 
2005); ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION AUTHORITY, supra note 155, at 28. 
 174. SOETA & ANDO,  supra note 19, at 167.  
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must consider the impact of these sound attributes when setting maximum noise levels. 
The following discussion deals with how regulators should factor in frequency and impul-
siveness, which is tied to sound duration, when drafting noise ordinances. 
1. Frequency and Tonal Noise 
The human ear is more sensitive to certain frequencies than others.175 To account for 
this, many ordinances express the maximum noise levels based on some form of frequency 
weighting. The Los Angeles noise ordinance, for example, uses an ‘A-weighted’ sound 
level network—expressed as ‘dBA,’ instead of merely ‘dB’—for certain noise sources.176 
This means that the sound-measuring equipment will make an adjustment and disregard 
the frequencies that an average person cannot perceive and instead focus on those that are 
audible to the human ear.177 New York City’s Zoning Resolution, on the other hand, re-
quires that measurements be made under the “C” network,178 which makes a similar 
correction but includes more low-frequency sounds than the A-scale.179 
While requiring measurements under a particular weighting scale is not unusual for 
noise ordinances, there are other issues relating to frequency that are not adequately ad-
dressed in many ordinances.180 The most salient example is tonal noise, a type of sound 
that has “a narrow sound frequency composition,” with usually only one or two frequen-
cies, and tends to have a specific pitch.181 Loudness—i.e., decibels—being equal, tonal 
noise is more unpleasant than broadband noise—which contains many different frequen-
cies.182 The problem with the regulation of tonal noise is that the weighting systems that 
ordinances commonly require, such as A-scale, do not adequately account for the annoy-
ance that this type of noise can produce.183 Further, tonal noise is commonplace in sounds 
emitted by various types of industrial equipment, which makes it a serious issue in the 
context of mixed-use districts.184  
Some ordinances have addressed tonal noise specifically, by including some adjust-
ments in their provisions dealing with sound standards. The City of Portland, for example, 
has a provision under which maximum sound levels must be decreased by 5 dBA if tonal 
                                                          
 175. NOISE METERS INC., Frequency Weightings: A-Weighted, C-Weighted or Z-Weighted?,  
https://www.noisemeters.com/help/faq/frequency-weighting.asp (last visited Feb. 2, 2017). 
 176. LOS ANGELES COUNTY, CAL., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 12.08.070 (1978).  
 177. NOISE METERS INC., supra note 175. 
 178. N.Y.C., N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION § 42-212 (1961).  
 179. BACOU-DALLOZ HEARING SAFETY GROUP, A- and C-Weighted Noise Measurements, SOUND SOURCE, 
Feb. 2005, at 1, http://www.howardleight.com/im-
ages/pdf/0000/0260/Sound_Source_4_AC_WeightedMeasure.pdf.  
 180. See, e.g., LOS ANGELES COUNTY, CAL., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 12.08.070 (1978); N.Y.C., N.Y., 
ZONING RESOLUTION § 42-212 (1961); PORTLAND, OR., CODE § 18.10.010. A (2010); SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, 
CITY CODE § 9.28.060 C (2001). 
 181.  EARTHWORKS, Noise Resources: Types of Noise, http://nf-
hrup.si/pdf_files/EARTHWORKS_NoiseResource.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2017); ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION 
AUTHORITY, supra note 155, at 28.   
 182.  Hansen, supra note 1, at 45.   
 183.  H.G. Leventhall, Low Frequency Noise and Annoyance, 23 NOISE & HEALTH 52, 70 (2004); SOETA & 
ANDO, supra note 19, at 167.   
 184. SOETA & ANDO,  supra note 19, at 167. 
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noise is present.185 In other words, in addition to requiring the use of the A-scale—evi-
denced by the fact that the units used are dBA instead of merely decibels—it corrects for 
tonal noise. Unfortunately, many ordinances—some of which require the use of a 
weighting scale—still do not correct for the impact of tonal noise on receivers.186 These 
ordinances will not be as efficient as those that take into account the additional annoyance 
caused by tonal noise, because they will not be correctly accounting for the actual harm 
that this type of noise is causing. 
2. Sound Impulsiveness 
Impulse or impulsive sound presents similar challenges to those raised by tonal 
noise. This type of noise “consists of one or more bursts of sound energy, each of a dura-
tion less than about 1 s[econd]”187 and is sometimes described as “‘clicks,’ ‘squeaks,’ ‘rat-
tles,’ and ‘pops.’”188 The problem with impulsive sound is that it is a noise attribute to 
which the human ear is particularly sensitive.189 Stated differently, it causes a higher de-
gree of annoyance than a steady noise of the same intensity.190 
As with tonal noise, some ordinances correct for sound impulsiveness, while others 
do not. Salt Lake City’s ordinance provides that “[f]or any stationary source of sound 
which emits a . . . repetitive impulsive sound, the limits set forth in subsection A of this 
section shall be reduced by five (5) dBA.”191 However, other ordinances do not incorporate 
these types of provisions, which can lead to undesirable situations in which sounds with 
the same loudness are being treated alike, even though one could be substantially more 
annoying than the other one due to the presence of impulsive attributes.192 The result, 
again, is that the ordinance will not adequately characterize the harm to the noise receivers, 
and, therefore, it will not be able to accurately balance the interests of noise-generating 
activities and receivers needing lower noise levels. 
IV. TRANSITIONAL ISSUES: GRANDFATHERING AND REGULATORY TAKINGS 
A. New Noise Ordinances and Grandfathering of Existing Facilities 
One of the central issues surrounding the decision to modify a regulatory regime is 
whether existing uses and activities should benefit from some form of transitional relief or 
grandfathering.193 This is a relevant issue when modifying a noise regulation in a way that 
could affect existing noise sources. In some cases, the recommendations in Part III could 
                                                          
 185. PORTLAND, OR., CODE § 18.10.010. B.2 (2010) (requiring that “the sound levels of Figure 1 be decreased 
5 dBA for narrow band,” i.e., tonal noise).  
 186. See, e.g., SAN DIEGO, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 59.50401 (1973); ORLANDO, FLA., CODE OF 
ORDINANCES §§ 42.01–.09 (2009); N.Y.C., N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION §§ 42-21 to -214 (1961). 
 187. Hansen, supra note 1, at 48.  
 188. Andrew M. Willemsen & Mohan D. Rao, Characterization of Sound Quality of Impulsive Sounds Using 
Loudness Based Metric, 20 INT’L CONGRESS ACOUSTICS 1, 2 (2010).   
 189. Id.  
 190. EARTHWORKS, supra note 181. 
 191.   SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, CODE § 9.28.060. 
 192. See, e.g., SAN DIEGO, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 59.50401 (1973); N.Y.C., N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION 
§§ 42-21 to -214 (1961). 
 193. Richard L. Revesz & Allison L. Westfahl Kong, Regulatory Change and Optimal Transition Relief, 105 
NW. U. L. REV. 1581, 1582 (2011). 
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lead to similar noise standards. In other cases, however, their implementation could result 
in, for example, more stringent noise limits at nighttime or regulators accounting for cer-
tain characteristics of the sound that the previous version of the ordinance did not consider. 
The question this raises is whether noise sources currently operating should be required to 
meet the same exigencies as those built after the new rules take effect. 
There are two categories of transitional relief: temporal relief and financial relief.194 
Temporal relief provides a certain period of time for old sources to meet the new require-
ments that the regulation imposes or, in other cases, simply excludes these existing activ-
ities from those requirements entirely.195 The Clean Water Act is an example of the first 
subcategory—it included a transitional period for existing sources to comply with more 
stringent discharge standards of performance.196 Other statutes such as the Clean Air Act 
completely exempt some existing sources from certain requirements that are applicable to 
facilities built after the enactment, or amendment, of the statute or regulation.197 Financial 
relief, on the other hand, provides grants, subsidies, or other financial assistance to facili-
tate compliance with the new requirements.198 
Even though there are supporters of the idea that there should be no transition relief 
at all, several authors have laid out the main justifications for grandfathering.199 First, the 
notion of fairness, which argues that “it is unfair to change the rules in the middle of the 
game; changes should only impinge on those who have not yet begun to play.”200 Second, 
a variant of the fairness argument that focuses on the idea of reliance: the government 
should not diminish the value of existing investments.201 Last, some commentators claim 
that grandfathering is appropriate on economic efficiency grounds because installing state 
of the art equipment in a facility that is being built will generally be cheaper than requiring 
that the owners of existing facilities retrofit them to meet the new standard.202 
As noted earlier, a key question in these cases is the appropriate treatment of existing 
sources. The fairness arguments explained above could lead to an expansive approach on 
grandfathering. However, some authors have warned against the dangers of a transition 
rule that is too lenient, pointing out that “[i]f the grandfathering rule is so generous that all 
of the existing plants continue to operate, there may be no demand for additional plants, 
and no new plants (or few new plants) may actually come into existence.”203 If that were 
to happen, the new rule would not be very useful. One scholar argues that the analysis for 
new and existing uses should be the same.204 More specifically, if the government uses 
cost-benefit analysis for new uses, the same analysis should be employed for existing 
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uses.205 Thus, if the reduction costs for the latter are higher, the regulator should adopt 
some form of grandfathering. 
In light of this, the inquiry about whether grandfathering is appropriate at all, as well 
as what form it should adopt, will hinge upon the cost-benefit analysis in the particular 
case being examined, and, possibly, on fairness considerations that the regulator may deem 
appropriate to take into account. As the following discussion addresses, however, the ex-
tent to which no—or very limited—grandfathering will be viable in a specific instance 
may also depend on whether the new requirements could affect some noise sources to the 
point of constituting a taking under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments. 
B. Could Amending a Noise Ordinance Constitute a Taking? 
The debate over grandfathering is closely tied to the issue of regulatory takings. As 
one author put it, “[r]egulatory takings claims are fundamentally conflicts over legal tran-
sitions. They arise when rules change, those changes are costly (in economic or other 
terms), and the people bearing the costs believe that they are being unfairly singled out.”206 
Legal transitions, thus, present this tradeoff: a generous grandfathering rule will lower the 
likelihood of success of a takings claim, but will make the new regulation less effective, 
and vice versa.207 Therefore, it is fair to say that the duty to compensate will generally tend 
to hinder change to some extent, mainly because it adds a budgetary constraint.208 Estab-
lishing the circumstances under which a modification of a municipal noise scheme could 
give rise to the right of certain existing uses to obtain compensation requires we examine 
the particular tests that courts have adopted to draw the line between legitimate exercises 
of police power and compensable takings of property.209 
1. The Takings Framework Relevant to New Regulations 
Courts analyze regulations that do not have the character of a physical invasion un-
der either the Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council or the Penn Central Transport 
Company v. City of New York frameworks.210 Nothing in the previous section suggests that 
a noise ordinance should be modified to allow anything or anyone to physically occupy 
private property. Having excluded tests dealing with physical invasions, both the Lucas 
and the Penn Central frameworks could potentially be relevant. However, the Lucas test 
is limited to a very specific set of circumstances: “when the owner of real property has 
been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common 
                                                          
 205. Id.  
 206. Holly Doremus, Takings and Transitions, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 3 (2003). Takings and the 
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good, that is, to leave his property economically idle.”211 It is important to note that a 
court’s finding of a complete deprivation of property derived from a noise control ordi-
nance is extremely unlikely—unless manufacturing is the only permitted use for that prop-
erty and the noise limit is set to a level that would make any industrial use inviable. 
Therefore, the next subsections will focus on the Penn Central framework. The Penn 
Central test, which is used to determine if a governmental action constitutes a taking, has 
three relevant factors: (1) the “economic impact of the regulation on the claimant,” (2) its 
degree of interference with investment-backed expectations, and (3) the character of the 
governmental action.212 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not provided adequate guid-
ance on the precise meaning of these factors or the weight that courts should afford 
them.213 
a. Diminution in Value 
Courts have interpreted the first factor to mean that “a regulation is a compensable 
taking if it reduces the value of the property by too much.”214 Stated differently, one of the 
key factors in any takings analysis is “the severity of the burden that government imposes 
upon private property rights.”215 Although the percentage of reduction that is required is 
unclear,216 the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, for example, has noted that reductions in 
value have to be “well in excess of 85 percent before finding a regulatory taking.”217 This 
analysis of the diminution in value of the property, however, should be done by reference 
to “the parcel as a whole,” not to smaller parts of it.218 This will be relevant in cases where 
only part of the property has been affected by the governmental action. In the particular 
case of existing uses, one commentator has pointed out that, in situations where this exist-
ing use does not contribute significantly to the value of the underlying property, this prong 
will not be very useful to protect the owner against a takings claim.219 
b. Investment-Backed Expectations 
As its name suggests, the investment-backed expectations prong is particularly rel-
evant when examining whether a regulation that affects existing uses may constitute a 
taking of private property. Before delving into the meaning of this prong, however, it is 
appropriate to stress that the purpose of this section is to examine how the regulatory tak-
ings doctrine may complicate the implementation of a noise regulation with limited or no 
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grandfathering at all. Therefore, the focus of this discussion is on the impact of a retroac-
tive regulation, a notion that has different possible meanings that are worth clarifying. 
Scholars differentiate between the so-called “strongly and weakly” retroactive laws.220 The 
first type—strong (or “primary”) retroactive laws—provides consequences for actions that 
occurred prior to the enactment of the law or regulation, while the second type—weak (or 
“secondary”) retroactive laws—“are forward-looking [but] . . . change the legal conse-
quences . . . only from the date of the creation of the rule.”221 A noise ordinance that im-
poses new requirements on industrial users would fall under the second category; it would 
typically not allow the imposition of penalties for conduct preceding its enactment but 
would prospectively affect activities initiated before the issuance of the new standard. 
Once the type of retroactivity that one may attribute to this kind of ordinance has been 
clarified, the next step is to examine the meaning that courts have attached to the expres-
sion “investment-backed expectations.” 
Penn Central offered some guidance on how to interpret this prong.222 The issue in 
that case was whether New York City’s designation of the Grand Central Terminal as a 
“landmark,” which hindered the owner’s future development plans, constituted a taking.223 
As one scholar pointed out, the Penn Central court gave substantial weight, when discuss-
ing this prong, to the fact that the governmental action at issue did not affect the land-
owner’s existing use but only the desired expansion of that use.224 It has also been sug-
gested that the content of this factor has become particularly confusing, especially after 
the Court’s rulings on later cases.225 Even if that is the case, the language in the decision 
makes it clear that the Court in Penn Central considered existing uses as the quintessential 
investment-backed expectation. The Court did not find a taking, but in reaching its con-
clusion it stressed how “the [New York City] law d[id] not interfere with . . . Penn Cen-
tral’s primary expectation concerning the use of the parcel” and that “[m]ore im-
portantly, . . . the New York City law [permitted] Penn Central not only to profit from the 
Terminal but also to obtain a ‘reasonable return’ on its investment.”226 
Thus, this prong of the regulatory takings test would seem to tip in favor of an in-
dustrial or commercial user who has been negatively affected by a newly enacted regula-
tion that imposes new requirements upon its operation. The next subsection will address 
the relevance of the government’s justification for enacting such a regulation. 
c. The Character of the Regulation 
The third prong, the character of the regulation, is probably the most elusive of all 
three. One scholar has explained that the Supreme Court, when analyzing this prong, has 
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examined a variety issues.227 First, whether the governmental action fits more into the cat-
egory of invasion or regulation.228 Second, the Court has looked at nuisance law to see if 
the regulation was pursuing the same end.229 Third, the Court has inquired as to whether 
the action confers a reciprocal advantage—which occurs where the regulation “impose[s] 
burdens and confer[s] benefits on all property owners”—as opposed to government action 
that burdens some property owners while benefiting others.230 Last, courts have looked 
upon retroactive regulation less favorably than those regulations that are only forward-
looking.231 
According to some commentators, lower courts have been focusing primarily on the 
second interpretation of the character-of-the-regulation prong, which overlaps with the so-
called “nuisance exception” to regulatory takings.232 In the context of a noise control or-
dinance, the relevant inquiry would be whether the activity that is being regulated is a 
nuisance. Under this doctrine, the government may regulate a hazardous activity—to the 
point where the activity is no longer permitted—without having the duty to compensate 
the owner.233 This principle goes back to at least the nineteenth century, when the Supreme 
Court, in Mugler v. Kansas, validated “[t]he exercise of police power [involving] the de-
struction of property which [wa]s itself a public nuisance, or the prohibition of its use in a 
particular way.”234 The Supreme Court recognized the nuisance exception in several in-
stances after Mugler, for example, in a case involving a brick mill situated in a residential 
area,235 or a quarry in a similar location.236 
More recently, in Lucas, the Court dealt with the nuisance exception in the context 
of a regulation that deprived the landowner of all beneficial use of his land.237 The Court 
explained that, in these cases, to escape compensation, the government must point to spe-
cific “background principles of nuisance and property law that forbid the use[].”238 In other 
words, the government may only regulate away an existing use without having to pay 
compensation when the property is being used for a purpose that had always been unlaw-
ful.239 An example of this, according to the Court, would be a situation where the govern-
ment requires the owner of a nuclear plant located on a fault line to remove it.240 This does 
not mean, however, that the justification for the governmental action would have to meet 
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this high standard to avoid having to compensate the property owner. First, this is only one 
of three factors in the Penn Central test, and, second, the other possible interpretations of 
this prong could still lead the court to conclude that the “character-of-the-regulation prong” 
weighs in favor of the government.241 
2. Applying the Framework to Noise Regulations 
Based on the above analysis, it cannot be ruled out that a takings claim could suc-
ceed, under certain circumstances, when a new noise ordinance imposes new obligations 
on existing activities. Given that the regulation would only be limiting the noise level 
coming from the facility, it is hard to imagine a plausible situation where that would auto-
matically lead to a deprivation of all economically viable use of a property—the predicate 
for a Lucas-type analysis. This would occur in the extreme circumstance where the noise 
limit is set so low that no other industry can be located on a parcel, and that same land 
cannot be used for any non-industrial purpose. Leaving aside this possibility, courts will 
generally examine the impact of this type of regulation on existing facilities under the Penn 
Central framework.242 The following discussion will examine Penn Central’s three prongs 
in the noise context starting with the second and third prongs, and then addressing the first 
one, which may operate in some cases as a tiebreaker. 
For the reasons stated above, the second prong—degree of interference with invest-
ment-backed expectations—tends to favor landowners that are merely trying to protect an 
existing use.243 This is particularly so if what once was an expectation has already materi-
alized into a tangible investment such as a factory.244 
As for third prong, the character of the regulation, it is complicated to determine 
whom—the government or the landowner—it would favor. Assuming that a court adopts 
the most frequent interpretation of this prong, whether the use is a nuisance, the govern-
ment would have a reasonable argument that enacting the first noise ordinance “do[es] no 
more than duplicate the result that could have been achieved in the courts—by adjacent 
landowners (or other uniquely affected persons) under the State’s law of private nui-
sance.”245 As pointed out earlier, if the industrial facility in question was already subject 
to lower noise limits, however, it would be harder for the government to convincingly 
argue that it is the new regulation, not the previous one, that is addressing the nuisance 
problem. Why should the new version of the ordinance be the reference point to determine 
whether the use “was always unlawful”?246 However, some courts have recently adopted, 
in the specific context of noise ordinances, an interpretation of this standard that is even 
more beneficial to government: there is no taking “when interference [with property rights] 
arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to 
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promote the common good.”247 
In light of the fact that the second and third prongs may potentially weigh in favor 
of different parties, the first prong—diminution in value—can be critical. While there is 
no bright-line rule for determining what degree of decrease in the value of the land is 
necessary to meet the standard under this prong, vague and conclusory allegations of eco-
nomic loss will generally not suffice.248 In the context of municipal noise regulations, there 
are situations where the diminution in value to the landowner could be important because 
the costs of installing noise reduction systems on an existing facility can be very high.249 
If the cost of the noise reduction equipment necessary to meet the new performance stand-
ard makes the enterprise no longer economically beneficial, the economic loss to the land-
owner would be very significant.250 Moreover, this prong of the test would also tip in favor 
of the industrial landowner if the new regulation dramatically reduces the profitability of 
the business, given that this would result in the value of the parcel being substantially 
diminished. 
In short, as one scholar pointed out, the current takings doctrine focuses on the ef-
fects of a regulation on a particular landowner rather than on the regulation itself.251 Con-
sequently, it is not possible to draw a general conclusion about whether a newly enacted 
noise control ordinance may require the government to compensate particular industrial 
users for the effects that the new requirements impose on them. Old factories for which 
compliance with the required reduction in noise level is very costly may have to shut down. 
In these cases, the owner could have a colorable claim for compensation from the govern-
ment, especially if the activity complyied with previous, more lenient standards. On the 
other hand, industries that can comply with the new standards somewhat more cheaply 
will not be likely to persuade courts that current takings law entitles them to compensation 
as a result of the burden that the new ordinance imposes on them. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article addresses the serious problem of increasing noise levels in urban areas, 
which is especially concerning at a time when districts with multiple land uses are becom-
ing more popular. The Article draws on the scientific literature on noise pollution to make 
a contribution to the existing legal literature in the form of a set of measures to improve 
noise control frameworks at the local level. Some of these improvements are based on a 
deeper understanding of noise and which of its attributes can increase the disturbance that 
it causes on the human ear. Other suggestions try to inject flexibility into these regulations 
to better accommodate the interests of citizens who need low noise levels and the economic 
activities whose operation inevitably generates noise. Although the recommendations pro-
vided in the Article focus on municipalities, these same principles can also be applied to 
noise control frameworks enacted by states and the federal government. 
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